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TEXAS v. WHITE.
7 Wallace 700.
[From the American Law Review]
The United States had in 1851, issued to the state of Texas
10,000 bonds of the denomination of $1,000, payable to Texas
or bearer. These bonds were made redeemable after Dec. 31st,
1864. No period of payableness was mentioned. In 1861 the
people of Texas ratified an ordinance of secession, 34,794 voting
for, and 11,235 against it. The legislature of the state on Jan.
11th, 1862, repealed an act which had been passed in 1851, and
which required the endorsement of the Governor, in order to
negotiate the bonds just referred to. It provided for the organization of a Military Board composed of the Governor, the Controller and the Treasurer, a majority of whom it authorized to
provide for the defense of the state by means of any bonds in
its treasury, to the extent of $1,000,000. This board contracted
as late as January 12th, 1865, with White and Chiles for a supply of cotton cards and medicines and they received in payment
135 of these bonds. On February 15th, 1867, a bill was filed in
the name of the State of Texas, in the Supreme Court to restrain
White and Chiles and certain transferees from them of some of
the bonds, from receiving payment of the bonds from the government of the United States, and to compel them to surrender
the bonas to the State.
The case was argued in February 1869, and was decided
April 12th, 1869.
The first question considered by the Court was whether
there was sufficient authority from Texas to file the bill.
Throckmorton, governor during part of 1866 and a part of 1867,
by letter ratified the filing of the bill, and authorized the prose163
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cution of the suit. Paschal, counsel for plaintiff, furnished an
affidavit that he had been appointed by Hamilton, Provisional
Governor, prior to the accession of Throckmorton, to represent
the state with reference to the bonds. He also swore that Governor Pease, who succeeded Throckmorton, and was governor
when the decision of the court was written, [from 1867 to 1870]
had renewed his appointment. Hamilton was an appointee of
the President, and how he could speak for the state, by virtue of
an appointment ab extra, is not apparent. The election of
Throckmorton, under the constitution of 1866, could have given
him no right to represent the State, for neither the constitution,
nor the election, was the free gct of the people of the state.
What is the proper government of a state, is a political question,
the decision of which, by the executive and legislative branches,
and when these differ, by the legislative branch, must control
the courts.i Now, on March 2d, 1867, Congress declared in the
Reconstruction act, "that no legal state governments" existed
in the rebel states. [Several were named, embracing Texas].
How then had Throckmorton been able to speak for the state?
As for Pease, he was made governor more by Congress than by
the people of Texas. Congress deprived Texas of representation in the Houses, and in the votings for President until it ratified a constitution which gave the suffrage to large classes
(negroes) that had previously not had it, and which took the
suffrage and eligibility to office from thousands of the wealthiest,
best educated and most important citizens. How a governor
who gained office under a constitution thus foisted on Texas
by an external power, could be said to have the disposal of
the authority of the state to maintain a suit, is not so evident.
The next question was, even if Texas had authorized the
solicitors to file the bill, could Texas maintain the suit? The
bill was filed in the Supreme Court. In cases affecting ambassadors, ete., and in cases in which a state is a party and in those
cases only' has that court original jurisdiction. Was Texas a
state? It was a political unit. It was composed of the people
dwelling within certain geographical boundaries, who were under a common government. But, so is the District of Columbia.
So are Alaska, Port Rico; so have been Arizona, New Mexico,
1
Luther
2

v. Bordon; White v. Hart, 80 W. S. 646.
Marbury v. Madison.
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all the states save Texas and the original thirteen. Texas was
once an independant state. By the concurrent legislation of its
own legislature, and of the Congress of the United States, it entered the Union Dec. 27th, 1845. It later passed the ordinance
of secession, and linked itself in a new confederacy with other
seceding states. Did it cease then to be a state, in the Union?
If it did, and had since not been readmitted, it was not a state,
in the sense in which the Constitution employs that term, when
it gives to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases in
which a "state" shall be a party.
Chase, C. J., in answering this question, premises that the
Union of the States never was a "purely artificial and arbitrary
relation." It began among the colonies. It was confirmed by
the revolutionary war. By the articles of confederation it was
declared to "be perpetual." Then came the present Constitution, the preamble to which declared that one of the objects of
the people in ordaining it, was, to "establish a more perfect
Union." The union under the articles was indissoluble. "What,"
asks Chase, with an air of finality, "can be indissoluble, if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not." But, how can a
"perpetual Union" be made more perfect with respect to its
perpetuity? Is there more or less of the eternal? Is it not evident that the "more perfect" Union of the Constitution, must be
more perfect In respect to something else than its duration?
But, the appeal to the articles of Confederation savors of the
ludicrous. These articles were finally ratified in 1781. The
signers of them, premising that it had pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of "the legislatures we
respectively represent in congress" to approve of the articles
and to authorize them (the signers) to ratify the articles, declared that they fully and entirely ratified and confirmed each
and every of the said articles of confederation and perpetual
union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained; and they solemnly plighted the faith of their constituents, that they would abide by the determinations of the united
states in congress assembled, "and that the articles thereof shall
be inviolably observed by the states we respectively represent,
and that the Union shall be perpetual". Who would have supposed that in seven years, nine of these states should cast off
this union, without the consent of the other four, and enter into
a very different union? And that a new government would
actually go into operation, two states, North Carolina an d
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Rhode Island being left isolated and independent? By these important events, we are instructed concerning the value to be attached to the most solemn protestations of the perpetuity of political arrangements. Chief Justice Chase would have made his
argument laughable, had he added to it as a scholium this little
history exhibiting how seriously the constitution makers rated
pledges of perpetual union.
But, what, after all, was the relevancy of the history of the
unions between the thirteen states? Superficial thinkers may
see, iu fictitious statements that the states never were separate
and independent, even before the adoption of the constitution,
an argument against their right to become so. But Texas was
not one of the thirteen. She had once been a part of Mexico.
Americans had overflowed her territory and had at length declared their independence of Mexico. The United States had
recognized that independence. The truth cannot be blinked
that it was as a sovereign state that she negotiated, first by treaty,
then by concurrent legislative acts, to become another of the
United States.
A brief digression may be here permitted, in order that we
may notice the venerable perversion of history of which Chase,
C. J., in this opinion makes himself a repeater. The original
states never were independent and hence they have no right to
secede, was the favorite argument of men who were more anxious to justify coercion than to speak the truth. The thirteen
colonies were never bound to each other. Their subjection was
to Great Britain, not to their sisters. Pennsylvania, like the
other colonies, was under no legal duty to co-operate in the Continental Congress with the other colonies. It could have withdrawn its delegates at any time from thaf congress. It could
obey or ignore the decrees of that congress. In 1777 the
delegates of the states drew up the Articles of Confederation,
wherein they declared, "Each state retains its sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and
right which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to.
the United States in Congress assembled." It retains every
power which, by these articles it does not delegate. Then it
had not already parted with any. Here is a solemn assertion
both of an existing fact, the complete independence of the states,
as respects each other, in 1777; and of the intention to part with
a portion of their power for the future, retaining all the rest.
In so far as, after 1781, when the articles went into operation by
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the ratification of the last state, Maryland, the states were not
possessed of complete power, and sovereignty, they had been
deprived thereof by the renunciation contained in these articles.
The promoters of the Constitution of 1787 even assumed
that this renunciation could be retracted by the states, without
the consent of their sisters. The new constitution was to displace the Confederation, when nine states adopted it. They
had the power then, to adopt it despite the Articles. When
nine states adopted the Constitution, the articles disappeared.
The other four states were left'isolated from each other as well
as from the nine. Virginia, New York, North Carolina and
Rhode Island were the states thus evicted, nolens volens, from
the existing Union. More than six months after the new government went into operation, elapsed before North Carolina
came into the new combination, and a fhll year passed by before
Rhode Island did the same.
When each state ratified the constitution, it acted as a completely sovereign body. When the eleven states that had ratified
it as early as the summer of 1788, started the government by
electing a congress and a president, they conceded to the two
states that had not ratified it, absolute independence. Rhode
Island might have stretched its independence over two; five,
twenty, fifty, a hundred years. When it ultimately ratified, it
did so in the exercise of an untrammeled sovereignty. So did
North Carolina. But the right of North Carolina to secede in
1861 was as much contested, as that of any other state; and it
is evident that the denial of that rightcould not be justified by
the principle that the state had never been absolutely independent.
Let us now return to the case before us. The thesis that
Chase undertook to maintain was, that a state's legislature, not
elected upon that issue, having therefore no popular mandate,
could, without a referendum, without asking what was the will
of their constituents, eternally bind the people who from generation to generation should happen to dwell within it to a particular political relation; a position which the makers of the Constitution tacitly repudiated in 1788, when they assumed that nine
states could stab to death the "perpetual" union of the Confederation. The ordinance of secession was adopted by over three
fourths of the people of the state; but the vote would have been
equally impotent, had every voter in the state, every inhabitant
of the state, concurred in it. Where did the Texan legislature
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of 1845 acquire this supreme and inexpugnable power over the
destinies of these people for all time? A mystery, truly, which
the lucubrations of the Chief Justice have no tendency to
elucidate.
But, might it not be that when Texas united with the
United States it became a part of the territory forever subject to
the government of the United States, without becoming an inviolable state? Not so, says Chase, and his argument is incredibly absurd. The Texan ordinance of secession, and the laws
passed in pursuance of it, he remarks, were "absolutely null."
"It certainly follows that the state did not cease to be a-state,
nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. If this were otherwise, the state must have become foreign and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a war for conquest
and subjugation."
Is it then true, that there is no American territory that is
not a state? Is Alaska foreign? Porto Rico? Were the numerous territories which have since become states, Ohio, Michigan, Arkansas, Louisiana foreign until they became states?
When the Union was established, the area of the present District of Columbia, was a part of Maryland. Is it a part of Maryland now? If not, is it foreign? A tyro in American constitutional history, is familiar with what is called a "territory" of
the United States, which is neither foreign nor a state. Of what
hallucination then was the Chief Justice the victim, when he
said that if Texas ceased to be a state it became "foreign"?
The areas which compose the empire of the United States,
are divisible into two classes; states and non-states. The
distinguishing note is, not that one class is American and the
other foreign, but that the members of one class are (a) the
constituents of the central government and (b) are possessed of a
wide power of governing themselves with which the central
government cannot interfere, while the members of the other
class neither share in the appointment of the national executive,
legislative or judicial officers, nor possess an inviolable right of
self-government. The people of a state make a constitution to
suit themselves, without interference from any other state, or
from the common government of all the states. They make a
legislature, of one or two houses; they define the power of these
legislatures, they bestow the suffrage on whom they will, on
men and women, and but for the 15th amendment, upon'whites,
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or whites and blacks. They elect their own legislators, governors and judges. They contribute to the national legislature,
each two senators; and all members of the House of Representatives, proportional to their numbers. They elect, severally,
electors of the president. The territories, on the other hand,
have no voice in the election of a president, or of the members
of the congressional houses. Nor have they an indefeasible
power to govern themselves with respect to what may be termed
local matters. "The power of Congress over the territories of the
United States is general and plenary.'
..Congress maynot only
abrogate laws of the territoral legislatures, but may itself legislate
directly for the local government. It may make a void act of the
territorial legislature valid, and a valid act void. In other words,
it has full and complete legislative authority over the people of the
territories and all the departments of the territorial governments.
It may do for the territories what the people [of the several
states] under the Constitution of the United States may do for
the states." 4
It is quite as imaginable therefore that what had been a state
should become a territory, as it is that what had been a territory
might become a state; that is, the people of a so-called state
may be stripped (for what cause is unimportant) of the imperial
power, and local power characteristic of states. They may -be
thus stripped for a lustrum, a decennium, a century, forever.
Did then Texas suffer (whether rightly or wrongly is wholly
irrevelant) the loss of statehood? i. e. the loss of the political
attributes whose possession marks a state? It is unnecessary to
say that it did. Governments made by itself were subverted.
A governor was appointed from Washington. The Washington
authorities dictated a constitution, which admitted to the suffrage many who had theretofore not possessed it, and excluded
from it almost all who had. The amendment of the national constitution is the prerogative of the states, exercising a judgment
free from the dictation of the central government. But, many
of the so-called states were made to realize that until a proposed
amendment was ratified by them, they should have no voice in
Congress, or in the electoral college. What meaning is left for
the word "state," if the people who compose it may be legislated for, from Washington, like the people of a territory, if
3

Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U. S. 1.
'First National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U. S. 129.
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they can be deprived of representation in national legislation
and administration as are territories, if even the right to a free
judgment upon the alteration of the constitution may be taken
away? Wherein does a state thus deprived differ from a territory?
Texas then, did get out of the Union of States by ceasing to be
a state. And she regained the rights of states, only with the
consent of Congress; that is, she was readmitted by Congress to
the circle of states whence, for a time she had been degraded.5
The Constitution says that no state shall be deprived of its
equal representation in the Senate.
Texas was deprived.
Hence Texas was not a state, when deprived, or Congress acted
unconstitutionally in depriving it.
Chase C. J., apparently admits that it was proper to suspend
the rights of Texas ,while she was rebellious, and afterwards.
"All admit" he reffiarks "that, during this condition of civil
war, the rights of the state as a member, and of her people, as
citizens of the Union were suspended."
They were suspended
longer. The war closed in 1866. Texas was not readmitted to
the rights of self-government and to participation in the national
government, until. 1870. But, what is a state, when the "rights"
of the state have been "suspended."
It is these "rights" which
differentiate the state from a territory. They no longer existing,
the state has ceased, To the people dwelling on the territory of
the former state, the same rights may be restored. When they
are restored, they again become a state. But the Congress that
restored them might have postponed that restoration indefinitely.
The supreme court has held that the existence of a government is a political question. Whether a certain community is a
state, is a political question, the answer to which, given by the
legislative or other political branch of the government, is decisive
for the courts. This is the only way to avoid contradictions between the departments of the government. When the Senate and
the House find a so-called state not possessed of the rights of states
it is incongruous that the courts should find itpossessed of them, or
of any of them. If Texas was not fit to assist in electing a president, nor in electing a national legislature, if it was not fit to govern
5
Speaking of the 14th Amendment, Thorpe remarks "Its adoption had
been accomplished by the enfranchisement [by Congress] of the negro,
and the disfranchisement of most of the white voters of the South." 3
Const. Hist. 406.
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itself, but its wickedness justified its being governed from Washington, why should the non-political department of the government say that it did. retain the state's right of suing in the Supreme Court? The court considers that the loss of the right to
sue accompanied the loss of these other rights. "No one has
been bold enough to contend that, while Texas was controlled
by a government hostile to the United States, and in affiliation
with a hostile confederation waging war upon the United States,
senators chosen by her legislature or representatives elected by
her citizens, were entitled to seats in Congress, or that any suit
instituted in her name, could be entertained in this court." But
why should the courts undertake to decide that a so-called state,
is, for the purpose of suit, a state, when Congress declares that
for all other purposes, it is not a state? This bill was filed three
years before congress conceded to Texas the organic right of
states, yet the Court entertained it. That is, Texas was not a
state and would not have become such except by readmission by
Congress, so far as Congress and the President were concerned,
while it was a state, for the Supreme Court.
The court concedes that congress by the act of March 2d,
1867, declared the government of Texas, inter alias illegal; and
by the act of July 19th. 1867, the state government, if continued,
was to be subject to the military commanders of the respective
districts, and to the paramount authority of congress. Such
declaration is utterly inconsistent with the statehood of Texas.
Afraid probably to say that those acts of Congress were unconstitutional, the court seems to think that because there was a
government in Texas, Texas was a state, as if that were not
true of any territory.
Texas being thus found to be sufficiently a state to sue in
the Supreme Court, though not to be represented in Congress,
or to govern itself as states govern themselves, the court passes
to the merits of the controversy. Are the bonds still the property of Texas? We have already said that a law had required
in 1851, that the negotiation of the bonds should be effected
only by means of the endorsement of the goveruor. It is assumed that, since there was no such endorsement, the title did
not pass to White and Chiles, unless the act of 1851 had been
abrogated by the act of 1862 which professed to repeal it. The
act of 1862 would have repealed it, had it been valid. Was it
valid?
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The legislature which passed it, was hostile to the United
States. That fact however, did not make all its enactments
void. Innumerable acts passed by it, e. g. concerning marriages, descents, conveyances, remedies for injuries to person and
estate, were sound. 6 But acts passed "in furtherance and support of the rebellion" were void. The Military Board which in
the name of Texas, sold the bonds to White and Chiles, was organized for the purpose, of levying war against the United
States. Did it sell the bonds in the execution of this purpose?
The horrors of war are largely mitigated by modern nations.
They are expected to care for the wounded, not merely their own,
but such of the enemy, as being wounded, fall into their hands.
The contract with White and Chiles, was for cotton cards and
medicines, not for powder and ball, horses and equipment. The
court's ipse dixit is that the contract was nevertheless a contract
"in aid of the rebellion and therefore void."
The court does not perceive that that being so, it was entirely immaterial whether the act of 1851 had been validly repealed by that of 1862. Had the act of 1851 still continued and
had the governor of the state endorsed the bonds to White and
Chiles, they would, on the principle adopted by the court, have
acquired no title.
But, does it "follow" as Chase, C. 3., says, from the illegality of the contract between Texas, White and Chiles, that no
title passed to the latter? The principle is abundantly recognized, that even illegal contracts, when executed on both sides,
bestow on the parties the same right to the things secured thereunder, as would have been secured had the contract been valid.
A contract to sell a horse, made on Sunday, is illegal, and will
not be enforced, but if the horse is delivered to the buyer, and
the price paid to the seller, the seller's right to the money, the
buyer's right to the horse, are as inexpugnable as they would
have been, had the contract been made on Monday. Cf. Brindley v. Lawton, 53 N. J. ]q. 259. In Houston and Texas Central R. R. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, treasury warrants bad, it was
said, been issued in aid of the rebellion. Nevertheless, if the
state offered to receive them in payment of debts due to it, and
did receive them, as payment, the debt was pro tanto extinguished. "The contract," said Peckham, J, "having been fully
executed by the Company and the State, neither party as be6

Cf. Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454.
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tween themselves can therefore act as if the contract had not
See, 1 Page, Contracts, 799; 9 Cyc. 550.
been performed."
Not a word is suggested by the court in justification of the refusal to apply this principle. The bonds had been delivered to
White and Chiles; the contract had been performed. Why did
the court undo it?
Congress found the demerit of Texas, for having gone into the rebellion, and for having been contumacious since the
restoration of peace so great, that it was necessary to deprive it
of the essential privileges of statehood. Yet the Supreme Court
looked so tenderly upon this errant state's shortcomings, as to
be desirous to suspend in its behalf the principle that the execution of a contract, though that contract were illegal, should
not be reversed in behalf of either of the parties to it.
Though
the state had plunged into secession, and had sold these bonds
to sustain the war of secession, it should get them back. It,
poor comparatively innocent thing, was not in hari delicto with
White and Chiles. Their crime was vastly abhorrent, but its so
venial! If this is not justification for restoring to the state its
alienated bonds, why does the court not tell us what the justification is? The matter is too important to be thus cavalierly
slurred. Or was the justice unconscious that there was here a
question that was worth a sentence or two?
Certain of the bonds transferred to White and Chiles, had
been by them transferred to others for value, and, it was alleged, without notice of the facts which impaired the title of
White and Chiles. The court thinks that the legislative acts of
Texas were sufficient notice, and that there were other facts
which could be fairly held to be proof of notice. But, actual
notice, it says, is unnecessary, because these purchasers purchased the bonds after maturity.
Did they? The bonds were redeemable after Dec. 31, 1864.
The transaction under consideration occurred in 1865. It is the
habit of the United States, says the justice, to pay its obligations
as soon as by their terms it can. Hence, a bond redeemable on
a certain day, is payable on that day, and after that day, if it
remains unpaid, it is overdue. The law merchant treats a purchaser after maturity as having notice of defects in the instrument, because he is warned from the fact that it is overdue, that
there is probably some defence, on the part of the maker. But,
unless the bill discloses that it is overdue, he has no such notice.
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What evidence is there that the ordinary buyer of a bond of the
United States knows that the habit of the United States is to redeem an obligation as soon as by its terms it is redeemable? But,
is it the invariable habit of the United States to pay as soon as
it can? The Chief Justice furnishes, no instances. The fact is
otherwise.
But conceding that the bonds were overdue in
1865, of what is this overdueneso notice to the buyer? Of defects
in the transition of the ownership of the original obligee, to the
transferee, or of defects of the obligation of the maker? The
Chief Justice cites for the principle that a purchaser of an overdue note takes it with notice of defects, two cases: In Brown
v. Davies, 3 T. R. 80, the notice was of defects in the obligation
of the maker. In the other case, Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How.
366, again, the maker's obligation was in question. If an
obligee holds a bond till it is past due, and then transfers it, the
transferee has warning that possibly the obligor has a defence.
If the transferee A in turn transfers to B, and B's transfer occurs a day or a week after that to A, A's transfer having been
after maturity, how is the fact that the second transfer is after
maturity a warning that the first transfer, which was also after
maturity, was invalid? The Chief Justice seems insensible to
the extraordinary difference between notice of defects of the
maker's obligation and notice of the invalidity of the payee's
transfer. Not a word that he says justifies the application to
the latter, of the doctrine of notice arising from the instrument's
being overdue.
We do not mean to intimate a denial that some cases warrant the application of the principle of overdueness to transfers
of a negotiable instrument as well as to the original obligation
of the obligor, acceptor or maker. Ashurst v. Royal Bank of
Australia, 1 Ames, Cases on Bills and Notes, 773; Id. 748. The
observations of the Chief -Justice show that he was unconscious
of the difference between the questions and that he did not realize the necessity of justifying the doctrine that a transfer of a
valid obligation, if made, when the obligation was overdue, exposed the validity of this transfer to question, even as against a
later transferee having no actual notice of the imperfections.
If the invalidity of the transfer consisted in the absence of
the endorsement of the governor, the transferee ;f White and
Childs had notice of it, and resort to the doctrine of overdue
paper was unnecessary.
If the invalidity of the transfer depended on the illegality of the consideration for it, it is indeed
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difficult to see holy the fact of overdueness has any tendency to
bring this fact home to the transferee.
The court intimates that the United States had paid bonds
of this series, which had been endorsed by the governor, and had
refused to pay such of them as were not so endorsed. But, had
the refusal occurred before the sale of the bonds by White and
Chiles? If so, is the purchaser to be assumed to have known of
this refusal when he made his purchase? The court apparently
thinks so, but does not distinctly commit itself to this proposition.
Hardenberg, one of the transferees of the bonds, purchased
them in the open market, bonafde and for a full consideration7 .
The refusal of the United States to pay the bonds could not then
have been known. Hardenberg did not buy them for speculation.
The only notice he had was that the governor had not endorsed
them.
On all points the opinion must be pronounced unsatisfactory.
On the political question involved, much of it is hardly less than
fatuous.
7See

dissenting opinion of Greer, J.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. WAGNER
Murder.-Accessory Before Fact.-Acquittal of Principal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.
Burd for Prosecution.
O'Hara for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
WESTOVER, J.-The prisoner is indicted for the murder of one
Leach, in that he procured one Clarke to kill Leach. Clarke has been
tried and acquitted for the murder of Leach.
The question to be considered is, whether or not an accessory before
the fact can be tried for a crime after the principal has been acquitted.
"An accessory before the fact is one who being absent at the time
the crime is committed, yet procures, counsels, or commands another to
commit it." Bouvier's definition.
Wagner procured Clarke to kill Leach and is therefore an accessory
before the fact.
At common law, the acquittal of the principal acquitted the accessory
also, so that the conviction of the principal must precede or accompany
that of one charged as an accessory. But this old common law doctrine
has been changed by statute in England and the United States.
Act of March 31, 1860, Pa., says: "That if any person shall become
an accessory before the fact, whether the same be a felony at common
law, or by virtue of any act of assembly now in force or hereafter to be
in force, such person may be indicted, tried, convicted and puuished in all
respects as if he were a principal felon." Nothing is said about an accessory being tried after the acquittal of the principal, nor have I been
able to find any case in Pennsylvania, which decides the question. But
in many of the other states, which have statutes similar to ours, the
courts have decided that an accessory before the fact may be tried, after
the principal has been acquitted. 126 N. Y. 661, is exactly in point.
The principal in this case cited, was tried and acquitted for the murder
of her husband but the court held that this was no bar to a prosecution
against the accessory before the fact. 26 Ohio St. 453; 18 Ohio 131; 20
Cal. 440, are cases which decide that an accessory can be tried regardless
of the trial of the principal.
Public policy demands that an accessory before the fact shall be tried
regardless of the fact that the principal has been acquitted. If it were
otherwise, many criminals, worse than the principal in the crime, would
be allowed to escape. This is the trend in almost all the states and the
question would be decided in Pennsylvania, just as the cases I have cited,
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have been decided. The old common law rule was a serious stumbling
block in the administration of criminal justice.
We think a guilty accessory may be punished, even though the principal escape.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Wagner is accused, not having been present at the murder of Leach'by
Clarke, of having procured Clarke to commit it. He is then, if properly
accused, an accessory before the fact. I Bishop Crim. Law, 411; 1
Whart. Crim. Law, 242.
To have procured an act to be done by X, necessarily presupposes
that the act has been done by X, 1 Bishop Crim. Law, 411. The guilt of
procuring involves the guilt of X, and proof of thatguiltincludes proof of
the guilt of X. Hence, although a statute makes an accessory to murder, a murderer, and authorizes his being indicted, tried and convicted
as a murderer, it is still necessary, in order to his conviction to establish
the killihg by the person whose act was procured by the accused. "The
guilt of the principal must be alleged and proved." 1 Whart. Crim.
Law, 254. "Since the act of 1860" says Paxson, J., "it is no longer
necessary to convict the principals before the accessory can be tried,
yet it is still requisite in some way to prove that the principals are guilty
before the accessory can be convicted." Buck v. Com. 107 Pa., 486;
1 McClain Crim. Law, 179; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, 254; 12 Cyc. 195.
The guilt of the principal could in the trial of the accessory be proved
primafaie, by his conviction. Said Bishop, 1 Crim. Law, 407, "Where
the accessory is tried after the principal, it is prima facie sufficient in
proof of the latter's guilt, to produce the record of his conviction- a rule
which does not exclude other evidence." Cf. 1 Whart. Crim. Law, 255.
If the conviction of the principal, is as against an accessory, who
had no right to intervene in the trial, prima facie evidence of the principal's guilt, it would probably follow that the acquittal of the principal
would be in favor of the accessory primafacie evidence that the principal was not guilty.
The question before us is not whether it is prima facie, but conclusive evidence of innocence. Does it peremptorily negative the guilt,
of the principal and, in consequence, bar the guilt of the accessory? At
common law, an accessory was discharged by the acquittal of his principal. U. S. v. Crane, 4 McLean 317; Rex. v. Dannelly, R. & R. 310
(cited 4 Whart. Crim. Law, 252), that is, the acquittal was conclusive for
the accessory of the innocence of the principal. The Commonwealth
could not, on the trial of the accessory, prove, despite the acquittal, the
guilt of the principal.
Has the law been changed? The 44th section of the act of March
31, 1860 enacts that an accessory before the fact "may be indicted, tried,
convicted and punished in all respects as if he were a principal felon."
But this does not change the necessity of proving the guilt of the principal in order to convict the accessory. It does not purport to change the
rules of evidence by which such proof can be made. It does not profess
to abrogate the principle that a negation of the guilt of the principal in
the trial of him by a verdict of acquittal, should be disprovable by the
Commonwealth in the trial of the accessory.
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The court and jury that try the principal, are the state's agents appointed to ascertain his guilt. They find him not guilty. Why should
the state repudiate this sentence of its own tribunal, for the purpose of
fastening guilt on the accessory?
In the analogous case of conspiracy, it deems the decision that one
of .two conspirators is not guilty, irrefragable evidence that the other is
not guilty. It is not merely primctfatie evidence. "An acquittal of one
is an acquittal of the other, unless there be allegation and proof of codefendants unknown. Nor can a conviction of one of two conspirators be
sustained, when the jury do not agree as to the other;" 2 Whart. Grim.
Law, 254; 2 Bishop Grim. Law, 106; 2 McClain Grim. Law, 175.
Conspiracy is a social crime. It is a concert between at least two.
Proof of the concert is necessary, and the acquittal of one of the alleged
concerting parties is deemed conclusive, in favor of the other, that there
was no concert between the other and him. Accessoryship is also a social
crime. One must advise or procure; another must be advised or procured
to do the thing. Why should not the acquittal of the latter, as much involve that of the former, as the acquittal of one of two alleged conspiring parties, involves that of the other? Even under a statute making an
accessory liable as a principal, it has been held that acquittal of the
agent, the principal, is an acquittal of the solicitor, persuader or procurer;
McCarty v. State, 44 Ind. 214. The jury had found the latter guilty before the trial of the former. The former was then tried and acquitted.
Discharge of the former, it was held, then became necessary.
Other courts, however, have found it possible by some other logic
than the Aristotelian, or the Hamiltonian, to say that A can be found
guilty of procuring B to kill X, although on his trial B has been declared
not guilty of killing X. The learned court below cites People v. Kief,
126 N. Y. 661, which boldly says "Now the fact that Carrie Howard had
been acquitted or convicted could not legally prove anything for or
against the defendant [accused of having advised Carrie Howard to
poison her husband] for he was not a party to the record. The general
principle upon which the admissibility of evidence rests is its relevancy,
or its tendency to establish the issue upon trial. Carrie's acquittal
would only prove that being tried first, for some reason she escaped conviction at the jury's hands." Hence it was proper in the trial of Kief
for accession to the crime, to refuse to receive the record of the acquittal. Yet the writer of this opinion might have recalled that a conviction of X for a crime, is evidence at common law of his unfitness to
testify, in favor of one who was not a party to the procession. A judgment against a corporation is conclusive against a stockholder, when
sued on his stock subscription, 23 Cyc., 1267; A judgment against an administrator binds the personal estate, as against the next of kin. A
judgment against a principal, is, in some states, conclusive, in some
prima facie evidence against a surety; 32 Cyc. 136. That a judgement
in one litigation may affect- one not a party to it is not an unknown
principle. A similar view to that of People v. Kief is taken in People v.
Bearrs, 10 Cal. 68; People v. Newberry, 20 Cal. 439; State v. Lee (Iowa)
60 N. W. 119; State v. Bogue, (Kansas) 34 Pac. 410; 12 Cyc. 197; 46
Ohio, 467.
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It would have been satisfactory to learn from the writer of the
opinion in People v. Kief, how conviction of the principal could prove
any thing against the accessory, if acquittal of him could not prove any
thing for him.
Is it not a scandal, a reflection on the administration of justice, for
one court to say that X did not poison Y, and for another court and jury
to say that A did procure X to poison Y? Justice will inevitably go
astray, when administered by the imperfect instruments which the state
has to employ, but its gross mistakes should be concealed from the inspection of those whose reverence and confidence are essential to the state's
stability. It would surely be better to adopt the principle that after X
has been declared not guilty of killing Y, A shall not be allowed to be
convicted of causing or procuring him to kill Y; just as, after a tribunal's
declaring that B did not conspire with A, it is not allowed to it to say
that A did conspire with B.
The mass of authorities sustaining the view taken by the learned
court belowis imposing. Whatthey lack in weight, they may be regarded
as making up by number. The 3d edition of Wharton on Homicide, p.
79 sums them up thus: "An acquittal of the principal is not a bar to a
prosecution against an accessory before the fact, since he stands charged
as principal." The law is made by the will, not by the logicof the legislative powers. The well written opinion of the learned court below may
be accepted as declaring the major judicial consensus.
Affirmed.

McCREADY v. D. M. RAILWAY CO.
Action For Death Caused by Negligence.--Effect of Time.
STATEMEMT OF FACTS.
McCready was very seriously injured as a result of the negligence of
the employes of the defendant company. By the aid of the best medical
attention and by the use of various mechanical devises he was kept alive
for nearly two years. From the day of his injury his mental and physical condition was such that it was never possible to consider for a moment his participating in a law suit. His physicians advised that the
worry involved would prove disastrous. Finally death resulted from his
injuries. Two years and three months after the injury and within four
months of his death, his widow began this action.
Watkins for plaintiff.
Mendelsohn for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
O'BRIEN, J.-The question to be decided here is whether the widow
has a right of action since her deceased husband did not bring an action.
The act of 1851 enacts that: Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence and no suit for damages be brought by the
person injured during his life, the widow of any such deceased may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned.
Therefore under this act she has a right of action.
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Did she bring the action within the required time? The act of 1855
requires that the action be brought within one year after the death of her
husband. Since the widow has a right of action and she brought it within
the required time she is entitled to recover.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
A question similar to that presented in this case was before this
court in Young v. C. V. R. R., 12 Forum 283. It was there decided that
though more than two years had elapsed between the injury and the
death of the husband, the widow was nevertheless entitled to bring her
action at any time within one year of the husband's death. It will be
observed that in that case the husband's action was barred at the time
of his death. If under such circumstances, the widow was entitled to
recover, there can be no doubt that, in this case where the husband's
right of action was not barred at the time of his death, the widow is entitled to recover.
Though expressing entire satisfaction with the decision in Young v.
C. V. R. R., we are forced to admit that it leaves the law in a rather peculiar state. The husband can, by bringing an action in h.s life time, deprive the widow of the right of action. If the husband brings an action
and dies while the action is pending, the widow has no right to bring an
action (Black v. B. & 0. R. R., 224 Pa., 519 . It has also been held that
if the husband has executed a release for the injuries received, the widow
has no right of action after his death (Hill v. P. R. R., 178 Pa. 222).
It seems, therefore, that the husband can deprive the widow of her
right of action by bringing suit during his life time or by giving a release, but that he cannot deprive the widow of her right of action by allowing his action to be barred by the statute of limitations.
It seems to us that allowing the statute to run is very much like
granting a release. A possible difference is the absence of consideration
in the former case, but this difference disappears if we consider the case
of a release under seal.
We are not convincad of the truth of all that is said by the court in
Hill v. R.R. We do not think that when executors are substituted under
the 18th section of the act of 1851, the action becomes one "for the
death" of the husband. This section provides that "an action brought
for injuries to the person shall not abate by reason of the death of the
plaintiff; but the personal representative may be substituted and prosecute the suit to judgment."
The person injured could certainly not bring an action for his death.
The 18th section does not provide, that upon the plaintiff's death, the
personal representative can bring a new action. It provides that the action brought by the person injured shall not abate and that his personal
representatives can prosecute it to judgment. How, then, can it be said
that the right of action of the personal representatives is for the death
of the person injured.
It may be argued that if the husband can deprive the widow of the
right to sue by bringing an action in his life time, it works no hardship to
the widow if it is held that his release bars her action. The answer to
this is that the act of 1851 ad modified by the act of 1855, gives a right
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of action to the widow "whenever no suit is brought by the party injured
during his life." It does not provide that the widow shall recover
"whenever the husband has not released during his life."
The analogy presented by the release case has no bearing, however,
upon the case at bar. In this case the statute of limitations had not run
against the husband's right of action when he died. The bar of the
statute was just about to attach, It has never been decided that the
widow cannot sue if at the time of his death the husband was just about
to give a release.
Judgment affirmed.

LA MOTT v. SANDERSON.
Wood-pile in Highway-Frightening Horse.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Sanderson owned a pile of wood; one corner extended over the highway, though not the travelled portion, for about two feet, but there was
left sufficient room in the highway for the ordinary use thereof. While
the plantiff's wife was driving along the road the horse became frightened
by a train and started to run. When the wood-pile was reached, the buggy
struck the part extending into the highway, and the buggy was overturned and the plaintifi's wife was thrown with such violence as to cause
her death. Her husband brings this action for damages.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STRAUSS, J.-Upon this statement of facts, plaintiff is entitled to
recover if the injury was the proximate cause of the wrongdoer and provided there was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
In Hoag and Alder v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad, 85
Pa. 293, the true rule for determining what is the proximate
cause is thus laid down. The injury must be the natural and probable
consequence of the negligence; such a consequence, as under the sur-

rounding circumstances of the case, might and ought to have been fore-

seen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow from his act.
Here the defendant was a wrongdoer in that he let the wood-pile extend into the highway for an unreasonable length of time. The road being travelled by teams it is not unreasonable to demand an expectation
of one or more runaway teams.
In Fergus Lane vs. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136, the Court held, in
an action to recover for injuries caused by the defendant's negligence, to
which the fault of another person contributed, the defendant's liability,
is not affected by the fact that the fault of such person was not negligence but voluntary wrongdoing, if it was conduct which the defendant
sh6uld have apprehended and provided against.
Here, we think, the defendant could have foreseen that a run-away
team would sway too and fro and would be just as likely as not to run into the wood-pile. So the defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury.
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In Miller v. Electric Light Co., 312 Pa., 293, the facts agree with
the case at bar; the defendant's employe left an arc light lowered in the
street in the care of a small boy while he went for a file. In his absence
a one-horse sleigh was driven at a rapid pace around the corner. The
horse struck the wires of the lamp, and the wires in turn struck the
plaintiff, who was crossing the streetat the time, and injured him. The
question was left to the jury whether the defendant's conduct in lowering the lamp or leaving it in charge of a boy while the wires were down,
was negligence or not; and the jury found it was.
This, we think, is even a stronger case than the one at bar, for here
the nuisance was being watched while in the case at bar it was not.
In the above case the court also found that there could be no custom
of the defendant which would excuse him for exposing the public to what
the jury found to be unreasonably dangerous. This, we think, will sufficiently answer the defendant's argument respecting custom.
Toole v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie Railroad, 158 Pa., 99, holds, where a
train of cars on a steam railroad collides with a street car at a grade
crossing, and a passenger in the street car is injured, both companies are
answerable to the passenger if they are both negligent, and the passenger may maintain his suit against either. If the collision was the result
wholly of the negligence of the Street Car Company, the Railroad is not
liable. So here, since no negligence can be sbown on the part of the deceased woman, and since the defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The owner of premises contiguous to a highway, has no right to
annex a part of the highway to his curtilage. Certain transient uses of
it are allowed; Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. 32; Rafferty v. Traction Co.,
147 Pa. 579; Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 95 Pa., 287; N. Manheim Township v. Arnold, 119 Pa. 280; but from this toleration cannot be inferred
the right to occupy a road with a wood-pile, or to cause the wood-pile to
project two feet into it. Cf I Trickett, Crimes, p. 213; Railway Co. v.
Cox, 2 Mona. 140. Although the township may not be bound to keep in
good condition for travel the entire width of a road, it follows not that
private persons may put obstacles to travel upon any portion of it. The
deceased had a right to the non-negligent use of the entire width of the
road, in case of emergency, valid against this defendant.
In ordinary circumstances, the deceased would have been under a
duty to avoid the wood-pile, although its presence in the road was a nuisance. Proper care would have dictated such avoidance. But the horse
became frightened by a phenomenon which was not under her control.
So far as appears, she was not negligent or unskillful in the managemedt of it, in its moment of alarm. The collision with the wood-pile was
by her unavoidable. That collision would not nave occurred, if the pile
had not been there. The defendant then furnished one of the causes or
conditions of the accident, and his doing so was a tortions act. Was its
connection with the accident too remote?
It has often been held that one who causes a state of a highway
which cooperating with a runaway, or other event, produces an accident,
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is responsibly related to the accident. Municipalities have been held liable for accidents occasioned by the absence of barriers, the proximity of
embankments or declivities, the making or non-repair of holes, the nonremoval of ice (13 P. & L. Dig. 22058). Private persons are equally responsible.
That, if a carriage collides violently with an immovable obstacle it
will be overturned; that, if so, grave injury to the occupant will result,
are not so improbable that they should not be anticipated. That horses
easily take fright at loud and sudden noises, or the apparition of large
and unusnal objects, should be known, as also that, when frightened they
become violent and uncontrollable. We see no reason for doubting that
the wood-pile was sufficiently near causally to the collision and its results, to make the placer of it on the road, responsible for the results.
Judgment affirmed.

HAWKINS v. SMITH.
Assignment of Lease.-Destruction of Building.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A lease for four years from April 1, 1905, was made by the owner of
premises to Hawking. On April 1, 1906, Hawkins executed a writing
which purported thus: "I hereby assign and transfer to J. Smith all my
estate in (describing the premises) accruing to me by virtue of a lease
therein from (owner in fee)." The lease forbade assignments without
lessor's consent. He did not consent to this assignment. The assignment was delivered to Smith at 2 o'clock. At 3 p. m. a fire broke out
which destroyed the building. Smith had agreed to pay $1000 to Hawkins for the assignment, but now declines to pay it.
Smith for Plaintiff.
Gilbert for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
UMBENHAUER, J.-By the facts of this case it appears Hawkins,
the lessee of certain premises, of which J. Smith was to have taken
possession, by virtue of an assignment unto him by Hawkins, wishes to
recover the one thousand dollars for the said assignment. Upon these
premises there appears to have been a building, and it seems the whole
case, or rather the bringing of this case, rests on the fact that this
building was destroyed by fire. The assignment was delivered to Smith
at 2 o'clock and he apparently went in possession; if not into possession he
had the right to possession. By his acceptance of the assignment he
consented to it and therefore the contract became in force.
However, at 3 p. m., one hour later, the building was destroyed by
fire, and then Smith claimed he was not liable for the $1,000 consideration for the same. He also sets up the fact that Hawkins' lease stated
the premises should not be assigned.
Now, if a lessee does attempt to assign or does assign property rights
the assigning of which is prohibited in the lease, the lessor has an
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option as to whom he will proceed against for the rent (Trickett on Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 439). In Boyer v. Smith, 5 Watts, 55, it was held
that "Lessees cannot impeach the titles of their lessor for any cause,
whatever, except for fraud upon themselves or the Commonwealth."
Hawkins in this case was the lessor and Smith became his lessee by the
assignment, Hawkins being in po.ssession and since he entered under
Hawkins title, or right to possession he is estopped from disputiug the
validity of the assignment as the plaintiff rightly contended.
In 24 Cyc. 968, we find the above point affirmed as follows: "One to
whom the term has been assigned in breach of the restriction cannot set
up the breach in defense of an action brought against him by the lessee
on obligations incident to the assignment; nor can a sublessee of the assignee set up the breach in defense of action on the sublease." This is
also upheld by a Pennsylvania case, which, in our minds, decides this
case. In 23 C. C. 153 Oil Creek and Caldwell Branch Petroleum Co. v.
Stanton Oil Co., it was held "The fact that an assignment of a lease is
in violation of a covenant therein does not prevent the passing of the
title. It does not lie in the mouth of the assignee to set up such irregularity while holding under an assignment which the assignor has ratified
by suit or in any other way!"
The sub-letting of the premises made the lease voidable and not void.
If the lessor does not object then in regards to third parties the legal effect does away with the provision. So held in Township v. McCaulley
Bros., 173 Pa., 314.
When the defendant assented to the assignment, he assented to the
pJ'.it he cites in his favor-the landlord, having the right to elect whom
be will proceed againt for the rent. The defendant cannot set up unfairness on this account. His only reason at time of suit seems to be
that the building was destroyed.
In 3 Pa. 444 Magaw v. Lambert. we find a building, insured by landlord and for which he received the insurance money. This could not be set
up as a defense against payment of rent of same building during tenancy.
The defense sets up the point of injustice liable to happen to the assignee if the $1000 is paid to assignor and which is supposed to be for
rent liable to accrue during assignee's holding, and then landlord should
elect to sue him. If he did, and the assignor were insolveut, the assignee would suffer grave injustice. We are of the opinion that the assignee takes these burdens upon himself. There was no evidence as to
fraud practiced by Hawkins upon Smith in not disclosing the lease and
its stipulations about assignments. Smith appeared to have knowledge
of the same and cannot set up this as a defense.
The case from 14 L. R. A. 155 (Note), cited by the defense, rather
affirms our opinion that if lessee be sued by landlord, he cannot sue the
lessee under him, by assignment, on account of the landlord's election.
As to the set-off claimed by defense we would again say he runs the
risk of being called on by the landlord to pay the rent and therefore assumes this burden.
Judgment rendered accordingly for the plaintiff for $1000.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The lease forbade assignments without the lessor's consent. It does
not appear however that abstinence from assigning was made a condi.
tion subsequent. The breach of the agreement exposed Hawkins, the
tenant, to an action for damages. It did not impair the right acquired
by Smith nor subject him to an action. He can get no advantage,
therefore, from the circumstance that the assignment was a violation of
a provision in the lease.
The assignment was delivered at 2 p. m. Smith from that time, became owner of the leasehold. The premises, the building, were his, for
the term. He has agreed that they are worth to him $1000, or at least
he has agreed to pay $1,000 for them.
A fire occurred an hour after Smith thus became owner, but surely
that is no ground for refusing to pay the price. Is a grantee liberated
from payment of the price, because of a fire occurring after the delivery
of the deed to him?
The brevity of the period between the delivery of the assignment
and the fire, is insignificant. A fire a year after would have been as
efficacious to discharge from the obligation to pay, as would a fire an
hour after.
The learned court belowhas wisely discovered no defence in the facts
adduced. Cf. Drug Co. v. Benedict, 104 Pac. 432 (Calif).
Affirmed,

HOYT v. GILPIN'S EXECUTOR.
Actionableness of Murder Committed to Injure Another.
STATEMENT OF FACTT.
One Shephard, a bachelor, was largely indebted to Hoyt and others.
He had no assets of consequence, but he was industrious and for several
years he had been reducing his indebtedness to Hoyt at the rate of $500
per year. Gilpin, with knowledge that the death of Shephard would
cause financial loss to Hoyt, and in order to cause that loss, killed Shephard, for which he was later convicted of murder and hanged. Hoyt
brings this action of trespass for the balance due him from Shephard, to
wit $2,000.
Westover for plaintiff.
Dughi for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
ROGERS, J.-The question here is whether an action can be brought
by Hoyt against the executors of Gilpin for the death of Shepherd.
According to the old common law, no civil action would lie for causing the death of a human being when the death of a person was caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another and the death was not instantaneous, any one entitled to the services of such a person, such as a master or parent, might sue for the loss of the services intermediate to the
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injury and death, and for the expenses incurred for medical attendance,
nursing and the like. But if the death was instantaneous in such cases,
and in all cases where the deceased owed no duty of service, no action
would lie at common law. See Cooley on Torts, page 271. In this case
the death appears to have been instantaneous, and even if it was not,
Shephard owed no duty or service to the plaintiff, sono action would lie
at common law in this case.
Statutory provisions have made great changes in this law in Pennsylvania. By act of April, 1851. See P. & L. 674. "Whenever death
shall be caused by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow of
any such deceased, or, if there be no widow, the personal representative
may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned." He could not sue under this statute as he brought action for
himself, and not as personal representative of Shephard. By act of 1855,
see P. & L. 674. "The persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death, shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of
the deceased and no other relative."
Hoyt is not under this statute entitled to recover. So, therefore, it
is apparent that there is no question who has a right of action. The
plaintiff has no right of action under the common law or Statutory law
and, therefore, judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Gilpin, knowing that Shephard was indebted to Hoyt, that he was
honest and industrious, and, if he lived, would pay his debt, killed Shephard with the mere purpose of preventing his paying this debt. An injury
to Hoyt was the object of the killing; the killing was the selected
means. Gilpin having expiated his offence to the state by hanging, his
property has passed to his administrator for the benefit of his next of
kin, or his creditors. The learned court below has found an obstacle, in
its judgment insuperable, to allowing reparation to be made to Hoyt,
out of his estate.
The common law is stated to have held, 13 Cyc. 310, that "no action
will lie for damages caused by the death of a human being by the wrongful or negligent act of another, in favor of the heirs, distributees, or
personal representatives of the decedent." If the heirs of the dead man
can not gain compensation from his killer, for their subsequent loss, it
would be difficult to discover why the creditor of the dead man should recover. The ground of recovery in both eases would be a loss measurable
in money. There are several cases which seem to support the statement
in the Cyclopedia, to most of which it would be impracticable to advert.
The principle was applied in a case of death arising from negligent collision of ships, to the claim of a relative for compensation. The E. B.
Ward, 16 Fed. Rep. 225; in a case of death in a railroad accident; Kearney v. R. R. Co., 9 Cush. 108; Skinner v. R. R: Co., 1 Gush. 475; Hollenbeck v. R. R. Co., 5 Allen, 55. In Myers v. Holborn, 58 N. J. L., 193
the unskilfulness of a physician, who attended a woman in her accouchement, caused the death of the child, and the shock of this event, injured
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her. The court, finding that the gravamen of the action was the death
of the child, remarked that since Gross v. R. R. Co., 21 Vroom 317, "it has
been considered as settled law in this state that no action will lie for an
injury caused by the death of a human being with the exception of that
provided by the act of March 3d, 1848, which permits a recovery by the
personal representatives of the decedent for the benefit of the next of
kin, of the pecuniary loss resulting to them for such death." The injury
to the wife was the result of the death of the child. A recovery against
a physician for the death of a daughter arising from his unskillful treatment, was denied, in Sorensen v. Balahan, 42 N. Y. Supp. 654, the court
saying: "It clearly was the rule at common law, that no civil action
would lie for causing the death of a human being."
In Life Ins. Co. v. R. R. Co., 25 Conn., 265, the company which had
paid a policy on the life of X, sued the railroad company, whose negligence caused his death. A recovery was not allowed. The supreme
court of the United States approved of the decision of a circnit court of
the United States, that the insurance company could not recover from
one who had purposely shot the insured, who died from the injury (Life
Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 W. S. 754).
Lord Campbell's Act., 9 & 10 Vict. C. 93, begins "Whereas no action
at law is now maintainable against a person, who, by his wrongful act,
neglect, or default, may have caused the death of another person, and it
is oftentimes right and expedient that the wrohg-doer in such cases,
shall be answerable in damages for the injury so caused to him," etc.
This seems to be a parliamentary declaration of the inability, at common
law to maiatain suits for damages flowing from the death of a person.
Yielding to these and similar indications that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, the learned court below has entered a non-suit.
We look in vain for any satisfactory explanation of the common law
principle. Christiancy, J., (Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich., 189), looking into
the deeps of his own speculations, suggests that it was the abhorrence of
the jndges and lawyers at making merchandise of human ilfe, at giving an
equivalent for it in pounds or dollars. We find but little trace of any such
squeamishness It is not so very long ago that it was customary to give
pecuniary compensation for life. Lord Campbell, and the parliament
which enacted his act, and the American legislatures that have followed
parliament, do and seem to have had this horror of compensation. Every
now and then when some mob kills an alien in the United States, the government has not thought it abhorrent to tender money to the foreign
government, as ar indemnity to the family of the slain, and when American citizens are killed in foreign countries, we are not superior to demanding money fromtheir governments. A few years ago we had the
edifying spectacle of the whole Western World, including all that plumes
itself on its civilization, its humanity, its culture, demanding and getting
an outrageously extravagant money indemnity from China, for the murder of Europeans and Americans by the Boxer ruffians. We can hardly
accept Christianey's flattering explanation of the motive for the adoption
of the principle. It must be remembared that one argument for the
present non-existence of a right of redress for the killing of a human
being, is that in the long history of English law, no such redress has been
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given. But that long history has revealed many symptoms of a lack of
reverence for life. Witness the sanguinary penal code that lingered in
England until little more than a century ago. Witness the horrible
slaughter perpetrated by judges and executioners for political offences,
and for trivial offences against the rights of property.
Another explanation is that any tort for destruction of life, is merged
in the public offence. But this is no reason at all. To say that it is
merged is simply to say that the law will not recognize killing to be a
tort, but will recognize it to be a felony. The law recognizes other acts
as both crimes and torts. There is no suggestion of any thing else than
arbitrariness, for its refusal to recognize murder as a crime and a tort.
When the principle was recognized that a tort died with the tortfeasor, it logically followed that, if the murderer was hung, burned, or
decaplitated, it was no longer possible to sue for the murder. In the
case of felonious homicides, then, since the execution would soon follow
upon the crime, there would be comparatively few cases in which an
earlier civil suit would be practicable.
But, there were many non-felonious killings, and the conception of
merger in the felony of the civil tort, would be inappropriate to such
cases.
The fact is that there is no substantial justification for adhesion to
the principle that the results of the death of a human being must not be
compensated for. The case before us illustrates its absurdity. Gilpin
purposely killed Shephard, in order to injure Hoyt. He has succeeded in
doing what he intended to do. Hoyt has been injured. The obstacle offered, is uot that Gilpin's death has washed away the tort, but that
Shephard's death, because it is a death, protects from liability for all
the effects that were wrought by means of it.
The learned court below has not considered the effect of the death
of Gilpinlupon his liability for any tort. The tort-feasors' death discharged, in many cases, the tort (2 Jaggard, Torts, 326). When the
tort is an injury to B by the death of A, the death of the causer of A's
death, will discharge the liability, even if it previously existed (Moe v.
Smiley; 125 Pa., 136). For this reason, therefore, were the one announced
by the learned court insufficient, it will be necessary to affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.

SOLLOWAY v. TREMONT.
Spite Fence.-Bill to Enjoin.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Plaintiff and defendant owned contiguous lots in the borough. Their
families did not get along amicably with each other. Tremont accused
the family of Solloway of too curiously looking through his windows.
Tremont's side wall of the house stood two feet from the division line,
and its windows were directly opposite the windows in Solloway's bouae,
whose side wall was a foot from the division line. Tremont began the
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erection, on his own land, close to the division line, of a wall that was to
be 16 feet high, the effect of which would be to darken Solloway's rooms.
This is a bill to restrain the erection.
Badger for Plaintiff.
Underwood for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MARIANELLI, J. -Before the complainant is entitled to relief in
equity in the case at bar, he must show that the defendant has infringed
upon the complainant's rights. Then when he has gone thus far, he
must show such damages as cannot be remedied in an action at law.
Therefore, if the first step in the complainant's case fails, it is needless
for us to discuss the questions of irreparable injury, inadequacy of remedy at law, and the jurisdiction of courts of equity, so elaborately discussed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
It is a well recognized principle of law that there are certain wrongs
for which there is no legal remedy, damnum absque injuria. The right
of the complainant to an injunction to restrain the erection of the sixteen
foot wall on the defendant's own land, cannot grow out of the simple
fact that the wall so erected will shut off the complainant's light and air,
and thereby lessen the "pleasantness of the home," but the right to an
injunction to restrain the erection of said wall, depends upon the question
as to the complainant's legal right, that is to say, whether his legal
right has been admitted or established.
Has the complainant established, or the defendant admitted, that the
erection of said wall, on the latter's own premises, is in violation of the
former's legal rights? Not at all. The complainant's legal right was
neither admitted nor clearly established, and consequently he has no
right to have the injunction for which he prays. Rhea v. Forsyth, 37
Pa. 503.
A case practicallv on all fours with the one at bar, is to be found in
Hsverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa., 368. This was an action on the case for erecting a close board fence, whereby the windows of the plaintiff's house
were obstructed. The erection of said fence, by the defendant, was
within two (2) or three (3) inches of the plaintiff's building, but wholly
within his own premises. The windows on the side of the plaintiff's
property were entirely obstructed. It was shown that the defendant had
much annoyance from the plaintiff's family throwing dirt from the windows, and from the windows being used by the defendant's family for
the purpose of overlooking and watching all that passed on the defendant's premises, The court held that an easement for light and air is not
to be implied from the fact that such a privilege has been long enjoyed.
The injunction prayed for in this case was refused.
The advantage which the complainant derived by obtaining light and
air over the ground of the defendant was not an adverse privilege, for it
was no sort of an encroachment on the defendant's land, or interference
with his enjoyment, and for this reason the complainant cannot protest
against it.
Shell v. Kamerer, 13 Phila., 502; McDonald v. Bromely, 6 Phila.,
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302, and other authorities cited therein, are of the same tenor, denying
the right to an injunction under similar circumstances under which this
court is now asked to grant one. Not only a long line of well established
authority supports our view, but the most elementary principles of common sense would dictate, in the absence of authorities aforesaid, that a
man may build upon his own premises a wall for the prevention of nuisance to which he would have to be subject, if his curious neighbor
overlooks everything that might happen to be going on, and thereby prevent privacy. If this injunction were granted, then the defendant would
have to suffer the very wrong for the prevention 6f which he erected the
wall in question. This could have been done only if there were a grant
of an easement in favor of the -complainant, and there being no foundation for this hypothesis, the injunction must be refused.
The complainant's right to an injunction being absent, the obstacle
against his prayer is established. The series of the authorities cited in
plaintiff's brief are inapplicable to the case at bar, for they do not deal
with establishing the position that the complainant has a right to the injunction prayed for, but they deal 3vith questions of irreparable injury,
and jurisdiction of courts of equity where there is no adequacy of remedy
at law, which principles we would follow, if the complainant's right to
an injunction were first established.
Injunction refused.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The question whether acts, otherwise lawful, may be rendered unlawful by reason of the motive with which they are done, has been much
discussed in recent cases. It has been presented for decision in cases involving the rights of trade and labor, in cases involving the rights
of land owners to use waters flowing over or under their land, in
cases involving the procuring of a breach of contract and in many
other cases. See cases collected 62 L. R. A. 673. The decisions of the
courts are in great conflict, and perhaps in no class of cases is this
conflict as great as it is in those cases in which the legality of so-called
spite fences was in issue.
In a large number of cases it is held that the erection of a fence upon
one's own land is not a legal injury to one's neighbor, although the erection may deprive him of light and air and may be dictated solely by motives of ill will. See 40 L. R. k., 177 where the cases are collected. The
theory of these cases is that an act, which in the absence of a bad motive is legal and violates no right, is not rendered illegal even by the fact
that it is prompted by a bad motive and is prejudical and injurious to
others. The leading case, sustaining this theory is Mahan v. Brown, 13
Wend. 261, in which the court said, "The plaintiff in this case has only
been refused the use of that which did not belong to her; and whether
the motives of the defendant were good or bad she had no legal cause of
See 25 L. R. A. N. S. 831; 40 L. R. A. 177 & 62 L. R. A.
complaint."
683, where all cases are collected.
On the other hand, there are many decisions holding that one who
has erected a fence maliciously, and with no other purpose than to shut
out the light and air from his neighbor's windows, is guilty of a legal
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wrong, although the fence is built entirely upon his own land. In these.
cases the adjoining owner has been given relief, legal and equitable
See 8 L. R. A. 184; 40 L. R. A., 177; 62 L. R. A. 693; 25 L. R. A., N.
S. 831, where all cases are collected.
There is authority in Pennsylvania to the effect that the mental state
which accompanies an act can have no effect upon its legal quality and
that, whether good or bad, it remainsgood or bad throughall the changes
of feeling, motive and purpose from which it may spring. "Malicious
motives," says Black, J., in Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa., 310, "make a bad
act worse; but they cannot make that wrong which, in its own essence,
is lawful. In short, any transaction which would be lawful and proper if
the parties were frlends, cannot be made the foundation of an action
merely because they happened to be enemies. As long as a man keeps
within the law by doing no act which violates it, we must leave his motives to him who searches the heart." Sentiments of a similar character
were expressed by the court in Covanhovan v. Hart 21 Pa., 495; Wilson
v. Berg, 88, Pa .167; Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler. 75 Pa., 467; Smith v. Johnson, 76 Pa. 191.
If by these statements, it is meant that a lawful act cannot be an
unlawful act, a mere truism is asserted; but if the courts meant to say
that an act which is lawful if done wtth a good motive is also necessarily
lawful although done with a bad motive, they assert a doctrine, which
is not justified by principle or precedent. The court surely did not mean
to say that if an external act can ever be right, it cannot become wrong
because of the motive, because that principle would be in conflict with
half of the law of the land.
There are many cases in Pennsylvania in which the tortious character of an act has been made to depend upon the presence of a bad motive.
Roy v. Sterrett, 2 W. 327; Collins v. Chartiers Gas Co., 131 Pa., 143;
Lybes, Appeal, 106 Pa., 626; McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155; Wheatley
v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528. In the last case it is held that "where a spring
depends for its supply upon the percolations of water through the land
of an owner above, and in the use of the land for lawful purposes, the
spring is destroyed, such owner is not liable for the damage thus caused
by the owner of the spring unless the injury was occasioned by malice
or negligence."
The analogy presented by this case is a strong one. Light and air
are as much a necessity as water, and it is a legal wrong to maliciously
deprive an adjoining owner of water by digging on one's own land, it
surely is a legal wrong to maliciously deprive him of light and air by
building on one's own land.
We are not, however, compelled to rely upon reasoning by analogy.
In Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa., 368, the court charged the jury as follows:
"If the defendant erected the structure complained of for the purpose
of protecting himself in the comfortable enjoyment of his property,
and not maliciously and improperly to injure his neighbor without benefitting himself, then the plaintiff cannot recover."
There is no reason for allowing a man to cause injury to another simply
for the sake of causing such injury. It is good policy to prevent acts that
work bad effects, and instead of saying that malice will not make a lawful
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act unlawful, it is much more consistent with elementary principles of right
and wrong to say that damage done to another is wrong unless there is
some just cause or excuse for it. We have, therefore, no hesitancy in
saying that if it clearly appeared that the defendant had built the fence
for purely malicious motives, for the sole purpose of injuring his neighbor, we would issue the injunction prayed for. But this does not clearly
appear. Nor does it appear that the wall which the defendant is erecting is more than sfifficient to protect him and his family from the curiosity of his neighbors.
Tremont was not making a purely malicious use of his property for
the sole purpose of damaging his neighbor and without any benefit or
advantage to himself.
Judgment affirmed.

